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HAS THE TRUTH-IN-LENDING
ACT WORKED?
by
Suk H. Kim and Henry J. Guithues
INTRODUCTION
The organized efforts of ultimate consumers to promote their interests
and to protect themselves from false and misleading trade practices have
played an expanding role in the 1.1,ide range of activities of government,
business, and individual conwmer creditors since the 1960's. "Protection against clear-cut abuses" and "provision of adequate information"
represent the major thrust of consumerism.' If we can characterize the
former as the old government approach to protect consumers, we may
characterize the latter as the nev. government approach to protect them.
The old approach was to protect consumers from false and misleading
advertising, overpricing, and shady products after they had occurred.
However, the ne\\ approach requires the affirmative disclosure of relevant information to the vast number of consumers at a time when possession of the information will help them make more rational choices
among competing vendors or creditors.' The passage of the Consumer
Credit Protection Act culminated "years of congressional study and
debate as to the propriety and usefulness of imposing mandatory
disclosure requirements on those \\ ho extend credit to consumers in the
American Market."'
Congress enacted the 110\\ famous Con,umer Credit Protection Act in
1968, 8 years after then U.S. Senator Douglas of Illinois introduced a
truth-in-lending bill in 1960 which required disclosure of credit costs
both in dollars and as a simple annual rate (the annual percentage rate).
Title I of the Act is more commonly known as the Truth- In-Lending
Act.' Both the Truth-In-Lending Act and a major po rtion of Regulation
Z of the Federal Re~erve System, implementing the Act, went into effect
on July I. 1969.' Since then two important types of events have taken
place: (I) a number of st udie\ have been made to assess the effects of the
Truth-In-Lending Act and (2) significant litigation has occurred in an attempt to resolve some of the problem s concerning the Act. This paper attempts: (I) to describe some important elements of the Truth-In-Lending
Act and (2) to evaluate the Act from a viewpoint of these two events.
~ P PHOAC H F:S TO PROTECT THE CONSUMER
Government action to protect the consumer started as long ago as 1914
when the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was established. The FTC is
still the principal guardian of the consumer against unfair and decepti\'e
trade practices. In the past, tht: government had not intervened except
where business practices \\ere overtly false and deceptive.• The old approach, symbolized by the FTC Act, focused on administrative proceedings to correct fal se and misleading practices after they had occur~ed. But the key to the new approach is the requirement that_the right_to
information should mean more tha n the right not to be deceived and mclude such information as product characteristics.'
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The Automobile Information Disclosure Act of 1958 emerged as a new
approach to consumer protection and required automobile makers to
post a label on the window of every new vehicle listing its make, model
name. retail price, and optional items with their prices.' However, th;
present consumer movement emerged in the sixties. President Kennedy's
State of the Union Address in 1962 was responsible for much of the present concern for consumer protection. In his Consumer Message to Congress in March 1962. President Kennedy proposed the Consumer Bill of
Rights: (I) the right to safety, (2) the right to be informed, (3) the right to
choose, and (4) the right to be heard. Such a bill was passed a few months
later' and the regulation of food was one of the areas chosen for special
attention. This bill, among other things. has made a critical contribution
to have educators and the public recognize the importance of consumer
education. Such things as money management, buymanship techniques,
and the problems and uses of installment credit have been emphasized in
consumer education as a result of the bill.
Since then "Congress began to make further important inroads into
the privilege of sellers, lenders, and advert isers to say nothing factual, or
at least as little as possible, about their products and services."•• Among
these are the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act (1965), the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (1966), the Federal Cigarette Labeling
and Advertising Act (1967), and the Wholesale Meat Act (I 967).
The Fair Packaging and Labeling Act of 1965 was a turning point in
the way government seeks to protect the con~umer. '' In modern consumer mark~ts, a package is a major promotional device. In 1965 Congress concluded that there was an increasing rnnflict between the
package's role as a promotional device and its role as a device of informing consumers about contents. quantity, and price. " The Fair Packaging
and Labeling Act was the outgrowth of such a conclusion. The Act required that every "con~umer commodity" mu~t carry a label disclo~ing
product identity, name and locatio n of manufacturer. packer or
distributor and the net quantity of contents . Its major purpo~e wa, to
minimi ze the comumer fru,tration in trying to determine the contents or
comparative co<e of the numerou, prepa ck aged items on the shehes of
supermarkets and other self-service retail institutions .
As a result of both the rapid increase in di~cretionary income of many
American familie5 and their expectations for continued high income in
the 1960's. different problems confronted consumers in the market for
more expensive durable items such as automobiles and furniture. Consumers' credit resources are needed to finance most of these purchases.
However, it was almost impossible for consumers to compare different
credit terms available and to choose the best alternative because of \\ide
variations in state usury laws. Many creditors did not disclose interest
rate~ at all, no single interest computation method was in use. ~ome used
dollars and cents as the cost of credit, and some creditors added various
fee~ and charges to the stated rates. These and similar practices were in
wide use before the Truth-In-Lending Act was put into effect in 1969."
Testimony before Congress s uggested that a substantial majority of
creditors were compelled to develop different credit disclosure methods
10 avoid violations of state usury ceilings."
Another problem that confronted consumers was that they were not
8

aware of two distinct markets, one for the particular good or service
desired and another for funds to finance the purchase. A number of empirical research studies on interest charges conducted before I 969 indicated that consumers were unaware of the dollar charges and annual
interest rates that they were paying for the privilege of using installment
credit. An equally significant discovery was that those who thought they
knew the rates of interest that they were paying had seriously
underestimated the true e ffective interest rates on installment loans."
The consumer unawareness of interest charges for consumer debt might
have been at least partly responsible for the serious abuses of installment
credit that existed in some segments of the consumer credit industry.••
The increased efforts of discontented consumers to promote their interests, a rapid expansion in installment credit, and some serious abuses
existed in the consumer credit industry signaled that by 1968, Truth-InLending was an idea whose time had come.

PURPOSE OF THE TRUTH-IN-LENDING ACT
The Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968 consists of four main
sections: (I) Title I of the Act," labeled " Truth -In-Lending Act," deals
with truth in lending; (2) Title II, " labeled "Extortionate Credit Transactions," is designed to cope with the activities of organized crime in the
area of consumer credit; (3) Title III,•• labeled "Restriction on Garnishment," limit s the amount of an individual's disposable earnings subject
10 garnishment and prohibits an employer from di smhsing an employee
due 10 one garnishment; and (4) Title IV deals with the establishment of a
bipartisan National Commission on Consumer Finance to investigate the
consumer credit industry. ' 0 It is the Truth-In-Lending Act that is of most
interest here.
The major purpo\e of the Truth-In-Lending Act is stated in section
1601 of the Act:
It is the purpose of this title to a\sure a meaningful disclosure
of credit term~ so that the consumer will be able to compare
more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid
the uninformed use of credit."

This language implies that the Truth- In-Lending Act wa\ intended to
provide for uniformity, comparison of credit terms, and adequate information. The Act requires that the total cost of credit be expressed in
terms of an annual percentage rate or an annual dollar amount; it provides the consumer with a specified manner to facilitate comparison
within the consumer credit market; and it requires that credit terms be
fully disclosed before the transaction is completed, so that the consumer
can obtain the cheapest credit possible.
Since the Truth- In-Lending Act requires affirmative disclosure of
credit terms rather than regulation of the terms," it is basicall y a
disclosure law." Therefore, it is not surprising to note that in its early
days, the Act was interpreted a\ remedial rather than punitive in
nature.'' However, there is sufficient evidence to say that in recent years,
the mood of the court has changed 10 interpret the statute in a punitive
sense."
9

ADMINISTRATION OF THE TRUTH-IN-LENDING ACT

-----

To achieve its intended objective, nine separate Federal administrative
agencies have been authorized to enforce the various provisions of the
Truth-In-Lending Act. For commercial banks, enforcement responsibility is dispersed among 1he Comptroller of Currency which supervises national banks; the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation which regulates
state-chartered nonmember banks; and the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System which supervises state-chartered member banks.
For the various types of organizations subject to their respective jurisdictions, enforcement responsibility is divided among the Federal Home
Loan Bank which supervises both savings institutions insured by the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation and members of the
Federal Home Loan Bank System; the National Credit Union Administration which regulates federal credit unions; the Interstate Commerce Commission which supervises creditors engaged in interstate commerce; the Civil Aeronautics Board which regulates airlines and creditors
subject to the Board; and the Department of Agriculture which supervises meat packers, poultry processors. and other creditors subject to the
Packers and Stockyards Act. All other types of consumer creditors such
as department stores and consumer finance companies arc under the
jurisdiction of the FTC." However, administrative rcspon,ibilitics are
generally vested in the Board of Governors while enforcement responsibilities rest primarily with the FTC.
Congress delegated the duty of promulgating the precise requirements
of the Truth~ln-Lending Act to the Federal Reserve Board. The extremely broad mandate from Congress authorizes the Federal Reserve Board
to:
prescribe regulations to carry out the purposes of this title ....
These regulations may contain such classifications, differentiations, or other provisions, and may provide for such adjustments and exceptions for any class of transactions, as in the
judgement of the Board are necessary or proper to effectuate
the purposes of this title, to prevent circumvention or evasion
thereof, or to facilitate compliance therewith.' '
Although the Board argued that a consumer-oriented agency such as the
FTC would perform such a task more appropriately, Congress concluded
that the Board has adequate power to deal with such a11emp1ed
evasions."
Under section 5 of chc Federal Trade Commission Act, the FTC can
ouclaw "unfair methods of competition ... and unfair or deceptive aces
or practices. . . . "" The jurisdiction of the FTC in Truch in Lending
cases is more comprehensive than it is in unfair and decepcive practice
case~ under section 5 of the FTC Act. Section l08(c) of che Truch-lnLending Ace states:
All of the functions and powers of che Federal Trade Commission under the Federal Trade Commission Act are available to
the Commission co enforce compliance by any person with the
requirements imposed under this title, irrespective of whether
thac person is engaged in commerce or meets any other jurisdictional test in the Federal Trade Commission Act. ' 0

In proceedings involving Truth in Lending violations, therefore. the FfC
has all necessary enforcement weapons in the Truth-In-Lending Act, as
well as those in the FTC Act. At the same time, one Federal Court ruled
that the FTC is not subject to the jurisdictional limitations imposed by
the FfC Act." In another step forward on the broader view of Commission Powers, the Supreme Court held that the anticompetitive effects of
trade practices arc not a prerequisite for FTC action."
In addition, the Department of Justice is empowered to institute
criminal proceedings against those who violate the Truth-In-Lending
Act." Section I 12 of the Act specifies criminal penalties for those
creditors who willfully or knowingly fail to comply with the Act's
disclosure requirements. An equally significant point is· that civil
pena lties may be imposed on the defendant regardless of whether he
committed the violation willfully or knowingly, or entirely innocently.

FUNDAMENTALS OF TH E TRUTH-IN-LENDING ACT

The Truth -In-Lending Act covers only "consumer credit'' transactions up to $25,000 extended to individuals for personal, family,
household, and agricultural uses, where a finance charge is imposed or
the charge is repayable in more than four installments." However, all
real estate credit extended 10 individuals is covered regardless of the
amount of credit involved. Excluded under the Act are: (I) any charge
account whose maturity is less than 120-day; (2) consumer credit in excess of $25,000 with real eMate cred it excepted; (3) business and commercial credit; (4) securities and commodities credit; and (5) credit extended
under public utility tariffs."
Compliance is required of tho\e people or organizations 1hat regularly
extend credit in their billings'• or arrange for credit,- to individuals for
personal, family, household, agricultural or real esta1e purposes. They
include banks, savings and loan associations, department and retail
stores, credit card issuers, automobile dealers, credit unions, consumer
finance companies, mortgage bankers, hospitals, and people who perform services such as doctors or home building and repair contractors, if
1hcy regularly extend credit in their billings.

Consumer Credit
Regulation Z defines "comumer credit" a\ credit "
for \\hich a
finance charge is or may be imposed or which, pursuant to an agreement.
is or may be payable in more than 4 in siallments. "" The four installment
rule was based on the assumption that no one buying on long-term credit
would pay in less than four installments, thereby preventing most
creditors from e\ading compliance with Regulation Z. The Federal
District Court in C hicago in the case of Strom polos v. Premium Readers
Service declared this four installment rule valid as a proper exercise of
delegated authorit y by the Ooard of Governors;" the United States
Court of Appeals in the ca,e of Mourning v. 1-amily Publisher~ Servh:es
reconfirmed it;•• a nd Congress subsequently amended the statute to incorporate the four installment rule." T his fou r installment rule
II

sometimes requires disclosure even though a finance charge does not actually exist. Without this rule it is possible for a creditor to hide the
finance charge by advertising merchandise at "$10 down and $50 a
week," without specifying the number of payments or the total true
price . .,
All types of consumer credit are broken down into two basic classes
"open-end credit" and "closed-end credit." This classification is impor~
tant because the creditor is required to make somewhat different TruthIn-Lending disclosures for these two types of credit. The open-end credit
must meet the following three conditions: (I) the creditor allows his
customer to buy or obtain loans from time to time, directly or indirectly
using a credit card, check, or other device; (2) the customer has the option to pay the balance in full or in installments; and (3) the finance
charge may be estimated by the creditor from time to time on an outstanding unpaid balance.4' All other consumer credit falls into the
closed-end class."

The 1-"inance Charge and the Annual Percentage Rate
The two most important concepts in Truth-In-Lending are the finance
charge and the annual percentage rate, both of which are defined in
Regulation Z. The term "finance charge" is used to mean "the sum of
all charges, payable directly or indirectly by the person to whom the
credit as an incident to the extent ion . . . . "" Generally the finance
charge must include the following charges: (I) interest or time price differential; (2) service charges; (3) special loan fees or finder' s fees; (4) investigation or credit reports fees; and (5) premiums for insurance to protect the creditor against the debtor's default. This list is not exhaustive.
Hence, the finance charge means much more than "interest" in the traditional sense. In other words, it is the co~t of credit in dollars and cents as
determined according to detailed procedures listed in section 226.4 of the
Regulation. Regulation Z regards a transaction involving more than four
installments as a credit transaction even if no separate finance charge is
imposed, and that transaction is subject to the Truth-In-Lending Act."
The annual percentage rate is the new common denominator designed
to measure the finance charge which reflects the cost of credit. It is simply the finance charge converted to a percentage in accordance with
specified procedures set forth in section 226.5 of Regulation Z." Unfortunately, either the Truth-In-Lending Act or Regulation Z does not set
interest rates or establish ceilings. However, about half the states have
legislative limits on annual percentage rates permitted in credit sales.
These annual percentage rates range from 10 percent to 18 percent, but
an annual percentage rate of 12 percent is most common.''
Different methods are prescribed for calculating the annual percentage
rate, depending upon whether the credit involved is closed-end or openend. For closed-end transactions, Regulation Z specifies the "actuarial"
method for calculation of the annual percentage rate," but the regulation allows the creditor to use the "constant ratio" method of calculating
the annual percentage rate in exceptional circumstances where he cannot
employ the actuarial method. ' 0 The actuarial method can be
mathematically expressed as follows:
12

P

n

=L
t

=I

(I

Rt

+ r/ l 2)t

128

with r

where P is the amount borrowed; Rt is the payment in month t; r is the
annual percentage rate which equates the present value of the expected
monthly payments with the amount borrowed; Bis the monthly percentage rate; and n is the life of tbc credit. The constant ratio method may be
stated as follows:
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where f is the number of payments in one year; c is the true dollar cost of
the credit, which is equal to the sum of all payments less the amount borrowed.
To illustrate, assume that an item ma}' be bought for $320 in cash or
the same item may be bought for S20 down and $76 a month for four
months. The problem can be expressed as:
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When we solve for the annual percentage rate, r, y,e find it to be 6.38 percent. The constant ratio method can be used to approximate the annual
percentage rate of the problem:
r

=

2.12.4
300 (4

I)

= 6.40°'0

Although the annual percentage rate of 6.38 percent under the actuarial
method 15 5lightly IO\\Cr than the annual percentage rate of 6.40 percem
under the constant ratio method. the latter method yields an annual
percentage rate that is, for all practical purposes, equivalent to the rate
found by the actuarial method." Moreover. the constant ratio method
offers the advantage of being calculable by simple arithmetic procedure.
For open-end transactions \uch as revolving charge accounts, a different method should be used to obtain the annual percentage rate of
finance charge. The most popular option open to ~he creditor is simply to
multiply each periodic rate such as I percent per month by the number of
periods in a year such a s 12 months a year. The annual percentage rate
would therefore be disclosed as 12 percent on most revolving charge accounts. There are three methods of computing the outstanding unpaid
balance on open-end credit: they are the previous balance method, the
average daily balance method, and the adjusted balance method.
The previous balance method used to be the most common method
and is certainly the most e,'Cpensive method to the consumer. Under this
method finance charges are computed on the outstanding balance at the
end of the previous period (or the beginning of the current period). The
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average daily balance method is currently most common ly used a nd less
expensive for the consumer than the previous balance method. Under
this method credit charges are calculated on the average amount per day
which the consumer owes during the previous period. The adjusted
balance method is not widely used and is clearly the cheapest of the three
major methods. This is because finance charges are based on the
outstanding balance at the end of the current period.
To illustrate, suppose that the comumer owes S200 on April I; that he
pays off $100 on April 15; and that the stated rate of interest per month
is 1.5 percent. The annual percentage rate of the problem under each of
these three methods can be calculated as follows:

Method

Be~innin~
Balance

Previou~ $200
Daily
200
AdJusted 200

l npaid
Re lance
of the
Month

Monthl) True Dollar
Ratt•
Cost or Credit

Sl50
150
150

1.5°'•
1.5
1.5

0.015d00 3.00
0.01 Sx I SO- 2.2~
0.015xl00 1.50

EHecti•t Annual
Rate or Interest

(3.00/ I 50)x 12 = 27'1o
(2.25/150)xl2= 18
(1.50/150),lh 12

It should be clear from thi s analysis that the previous balance method is
the most expensive method to the comumer and that the adjusted
balance method is the cheapest method. Today's comumer is better
educated, better informed, and is not afraid to speak out. Thus, it is not
surprising to find that man} stores are switching to the daily balance
metbod to avoid mounting criticism of the previous balance method
\\hich "as once most popular.''
DiM:losures Re uired

The creditor is required to make somewhat different disclosures for
closed-end credit and open-end credit. In all cases, however, the
disclosure must be made clearly and conspicuously. Section 226.8 of
Regulation Z govern\ di sclosure of clo~ed-end credit terms, whereas sec•
tion 226. 7 of the Regulation imposes di5closure requirements for open·
end credit.
In closed-end credit, the following disclo~ures mu,t be made: (I) the
cash price; (2) the downpayment; (3) the unpaid balance of the cash
price; (4) the finance charge and its annual percentage rate: (5) any
prepaid finance charge; (6) the deferred payment; (7) the repayment
schedule: (8) default and delinquency charges: (9) a description of an}
~ecurity interest and the collateral." These required disclosures must be
made before credit is extended, but they may be made in the insrallment
contract, the note, or other document signed by the comumer which
evidences the exiMence of debt.
In open-end credit transactions, two separate disclosures are required:
(I) before the first transaction is made and (2) with each monthly billing
statement. Before the account is opened for the first time, the following
disclosures must be made: ( I) the conditions under which a finance
charge may be imposed, including an expla n ation of the period t hat the
credit extended may be repaid without charge: (2) the method t hat the
14

creditor uses to determine the amount of the finance charge; (3) any
minimum or fixed charge; (4) the periodic rate or the nominal annual
percentage rate if more than one is applicable; and (5) the minimum payment which must be made at each billing." At the time of each monthly
billing statement, the following disclosures must be made: (I) the
previous balance; (2) the outstanding balance in the account on the statement date; (3) an itemization of credit transactions during the month; (4)
the amount of any finance charge debited to the account during the
month; (5) the periodic rate and the nominal annual percentage rate; (6)
the balance on which the latest finance charge was based; (7) the closing
date of the billing cycle; and (8) the date by which payment must he made
to avoid additional finance charges."
Failure to comply with the disclosure requirements set forth in sections
226.7 and 226.8 of Regulation Z can he devastating for a creditor. In a
class action seeking millions of dollars in civil damages, Chemical Bank
of New York was found liable for its failure to disclose the nominal annual percent age rates to its cmtomer, who had incurred no finance
charge during the previous month.''

Amendments to the Truth-In-Lending Act of 1968
A variety of similar bills have been passed by or are pending in Congress since tht: Truth-In-Lending Act ,\cnt into effect in 1969. One of
them i~ the Fair Credit Reporting Act which hecamc effective in April
1971.'' Thi~ Act attempts to regulate the actions of credit bureaus which
disseminate erroneous information about consumers. First, this Act requires bank, and credit companies to make their customer credit files
available to the persons in question. The requirement provides the consumer with a right to examine hi\ credit records and to correct errors and
false information in such reports. Secondly, if the credit application is rejected, the prospective creditor is required to give the comumer the name
and address of the credit hureau that supplied the information causing
the application to he rejected. This credit bureau must then inform the
consumer upon request the nature and 5uh,tance of all information li\ted
in hb credit file. Thirdly, under this Act, the consumer credit records are
a,ailable only to those: (l) who mw,t evaluate a person for insurance,
credit, and employment; (2) who secured the consumer's permbsion; and
(3) who 5ecured court permission.
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act Y.hich went into effect in October
1975 prohibits creditors from judging loan appti,ant~ on the basis of ~ex
or marital status." Under this Act, loan applicant5 are guaranteed an explanation from creditors if loan requests have be"en rejected. This is par
ticularly significant for \\ omen because creditors are not alloY.ed l 1) to
a\k if a loan applicant is married or single. and (2) to deny a married
woman's right to open her O\\ n account.
The Fair Credit Billing Act which went into effect in October 1975
deals with ( 1) the old "holder in due course" doctrine; (2) billing errors;
and (3) bill handling." Under the holder in <lue course doctrine, the consumer was required to cont inue making payment s to a third party
creditor even though the merchandise purchased proved to be faulty. The
Act overturned 1his doctrine. The second area has to do with billing er15

-

rors and complaints. If a consumer finds a billing error, he must provide
the creditor with a proper written notification. The creditor is required to
acknowledge this inquiry within 30 days and to resolve the problem
within 90 days. So long as the problem is not resolved, the consumer is
free of any finance charge or other charge on the disputed amount for an
indefinite period. Finally, the Act requires the creditor to mail bills at
least 14 days before payments are due. The bills also must contain an ad.
dress of where complaints are handled and must remind the consumer of
his right every six months.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE Of THE EFFICACY
Of THE TRUTH-1"1-LE:-..DING ACT

The basic philosophy of the Truth·ln·Lending Act was to "let the
buyer beware" and to "let the \eller disclose."•• Have consumer
creditors complied with the disclosure requirements of the Act? Has
there been an increase in consumer awareness of credit costs since the Act
was put into effect in 1969? This section reports the results of an in•
vestigation of these questions.
During the pre•regulation period, a number of studies were conducted
which established the following propositions concerning credit practices:
(I) Consumers were unable to shop for credit in any effective way
because the price of credit was not disclosed or disclosed in such a wide
variety of ways that meaningful comparisons were practically impossi•
ble. •• (2) Serious abuses existed in \Ome segments of the consumer credit
industry."
Although Truth·ln•Lending disclosure requirements are frequently
long, complex, and perhaps difficult for consumer creditors to under\tand and to comply with, two nationwide surveys of credit compliance
on Truth•ln-Lending found that 86 percent of the major creditors using
retail installment contracts "'ere in substantial compliance with the law."
The surveys conducted by the FTC covered the five major classes of con•
\umer creditors, and a random sample of I 15 cities were dra"'n from the
largest cities in the country. Ne" car dealers were found to he in best
compliance with the disclosure requirements of the Act in contrast to
used car dealers and jewelry stores, which were in the lowest class of
compliance. Home improvement and repair contractors, televi\ion and
appliance dealers, and furniture stores "'ere found to be in berneen these
two extremes. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
concluded that compliance by supervised financial institution\ is much
better than that of the retail installment crrditors surveyed by the FTC."
These findings and other indications clearly \how that the Truth• ln·
Lending Act has been working to eliminate or minimize the two types of
undesirable practices "hich existed in the pre•regulation period.
Although the compliance record of consumer creditors is relatively
good, they must assign a high priority to effective compliance programs
to avoid intentional violations and to minimize unintentional violations:
(I) there are numerous severe sanctions that may be imposed against
those who violate the disclosure requirements;•• (2) today's consumers
are better educated, better informed, and not afraid to speak out;•• (3)
the court has cont inued to construe the statute in the punitive sense;''
16

and (4) rigorous compliance can make it possible for the creditor to avoid
costly court proceedings and to keep its customers happy, which may
result in increased customer loyalty.
An important purpose of the Truth-In-Lending Act was to enable
prospective borrowers to compare the cost of loans of varying principals,
interest cha rges, and maturities, all of which can be used to make the best
choice among competing vendors. Those who supported the passage of
the Act argued that these competitive factors in turn would force con•
sumer creditors to approximate the most favorable terms offered by
other creditors in the market.•• However, some individuals claimed that
the impact of the legislation would be marginal because (I) consumers
are insensitive to finance charge rates and other information disclosed;
and (2) they may not have a choice of creditors.•• Several studies con•
ducted before the Act went into effect in 1969 con firmed that (I) most
consumers were unaware of the dollar charges and annual percentage
rates that they were paying on installment credit; and (2) many consumers tended to underestimate the annual percentage rates that they
were paying. ' 0
However, a number of studies made after the Act became effective in
1969 found that there were significant gains in consumer awareness of
credit costs even if a majority of consumers still remained unaware and
continued to underestimate the annual percentage rates they were pay•
ing. One such study was made by Lewis Mandell. " The accuracy of con·
sumer perception of interest rates on automobile loans was tested by
comparing the rates reported by respondents with the rates computed by
the simple discount method ."' The study found that installment credit
buyers were more aware of "hat rate of interest they were paying after
the Act than before the Act. However, he concluded that a majority of
consumers were still una,\are of what rate of interest they were paying on
automobile loam.
A more comprehensive study of this type was conducted by George G.
Parker and Robert P. Shay. ' ' They used the data originated in two na·
tionwide surveys commis~ioned by the Board of Governors and collected
by the National Commission on Consumer Finance. For closed•end
credit transactiom, 14. 9 percent of the respondents knew what rate of in•
terest they were paying in 1969, while 38.6 percent were aware of what
rate of interest they were paying in I 970. For open-end credit transactions, overall perception increased from 25. 7 percent in I 969 to 56.4 percent in 1970. They also found that (I) the educational level of installment
borrowers and their knowledge of the existence of the Act proved to have
the most important effect on consumer know ledge of incurred interest
rates; (2) age, sex, housing status, and region proved to have virtually no
effect on consumer perception of credit costs; and (3) poverty level, income, and race were found to be in between. Several other studies produced similar results."

TRUTH-IN-LENDl1'G LITIGATION
To overcome many fo rmidable obstacles to creditor compliance with
the Truth-In-Lendi ng Act, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System and other federal agencies with responsibilities for en17

forcement organized and administered massive education programs in
the months after the Act was enacted. For example, the Board of Gover•
nors prepared more than one million copies of an informational pam.
phlet, entitled "What You Ought to Know About Truth•in•Lending"
and distributed them to creditors and the public." The FTC also had
been releasing a series of detailed Consumer Cred/t Policy Statements as
part of its education policy.,. The empirical findings about the effects of
the Act described in the previous section strongly indicates that these
educational programs paid off. In another step forward on an effort to
resolve some of the problems concerning the Act, substantial Truth-inLending litigation has taken place since the Act was put into effect on
July I, 1969. The remaining portion of this paper attempts to briefly examine some of court proceedings with respect to civil penalties and credit
advertising."

Civil Penalties
A creditor may be sued for an amount equal to twice the inance
charge with a minimum of $100 and a maximum of $1,000 if he: (I) fails
to make the required disclosures; (2) cannot prove that the violation was
unintentional and resulted from a bona fide error; and (3) fails to catch
and correct the error after it was found. " In a class action. penalties of
up to $100,000 or I percent of the creditor's net worth, whichever is less,
may be assessed against a creditor who fails to make the required
disclosures under the Act.''
The basic 'purpose of these penalties is to prevent creditors from
evading compliance with the disclosure requirements of the Act.
Although an "aggrieved debtor" can sue the violator in any United
States district court within one year after the violation took place, he has
the burden of proving the alleged violation." In the case of Grandway
Credit Corp. v. Brown, the district court judge ruled that the creditor
must disprove the alleged violation, but the court of appeals reversed the
lower court decision."
The Act requires that the violator be first sued for any actual damages
incurred by the consumer due to the violation. This implies that the
creditor is not liable to the consumer when no actual damages were involved. However, a number of courts ruled that civil penalties can be
assessed against the creditor even if no actual damages are involved."
This decision was based on the rule handed down by the Supreme Court
in Mourning v. Family Publications Services, Inc. 14 The Court reasoned
that the civil penalty of an amount equal to twice the finance charge, but
in no case more than $1,000 or less than $100, is modest.
For unintentional and bonafide errors, the Act states:
A creditor may not be held liable in any action brought under
this section of a violation of this title if the creditor shows by a
preponderance of the evidence that the violation was not inten·
tional and resulted from a bonafide error notwithstanding the
maintenance of procedures reasonably adopted to avoid any
such error. "
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Many creditors have used this provision as a defense that the error was
unintentional and in good faith.
The court in the case of Ratner v. Chemical Bank of New York noted
that (I) section 1640 of the Act was intended as a defense only for
"clerical errors"; (2) the defendant has the burden of proving that the
clerical error was not intentional; (3) the defendant must show that due
care was taken to avoid the error; and (4) good faith errors made in process of interpreting law are not regarded as "bona fide errors."" Several
other courts have accepted this interpretation and limited bonafide errors
to only clerical errors."

Credit Advertising
Since advertising plays a crucial role in credit transactions and can be
terribly misleading, both the Truth-in-Lending Act and Regulation Z
tightly regulate all types of consumer credit advertising: closed-end credit
plans, open-end credit plans, and "bait" advertising. Two general rules
contained in Regulation Z are: (I) no advertisement may state that no
downpayment will be required or that a specified downpayment will be
arranged unless the creditor offers such favorable terms to practically all
consumers; and (2) no advertisement may state that a specified amount
of credit or installment size can be arranged unless the creditor was indeed willing to offer such installments to practically all consumers."
These two general rules are comparable to FTC prohibitions against bait
advertising."
The three basic assumptions underlying the regulation of credit advertising are: (I) a substantial portion of all credit purchase is induced by
advertised credit terms; (2) all pertinent information included in credit
advertising can be used for consumers to shop more effectively among
alternative sources of credit; and (3) another purpose of this regulation is
the prevention of bait advertising. Thus, any advertising that does not
promote an extention of credit and that does not include one or more
specific credit terms, is not required to conform to Regulation Z.'0
The Act authorizes the FTC to enforce its credit advertising provisions." While the Act specifies the required disclosures for credit advertising, it does not preclude the FTC from regulating any unfair or deceptive credit advertising which does not violate the explicit requirements of
the Act." The cease and desist order used by the FTC to correct law
violations under its jurisdiction has an extra power in application to the
Truth-in-Lending Act, because every practice in violation of Truth-inLending also violates the FTC Act. Therefore, the violation of the Act's
advertising provisions is as if it were a violation of the FTC Act itself."
Individual consumers may sue to enforce other sections of the Truthin-Lending Act,•• but they are not authorized to enforce the Act's credit
advertising provisions." Only the FTC and other government enforcement agencies are allowed to seek both civil and criminal penaltie~ for
credit advertising violations." Private citizens are not authorized to sue
those who violate credit advertising provisions unless they suffer specific
injury from these illegal advertisements."
The advertisements covered by the Act and Regulation Z may take virtually any form: newspaper ads, magazine ads, plugs on radio, television
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system, leaflets, direct mail, catalogs, point-of-purchase ads, exterior or
interior signs or displays." A_ltho~gh both the creditor and its advertising
agency may be hable for a v1olat1on of the Act's advertising provisions
publishers and broadcasters are exempt from liability for publishin~
advertisements that violate the Act's advertising provisions.•• Nevertheless, media officials must take every precautionary action to avoid the
untrue or incomplete publication of an advertisement for two reasons:
(1) this type of publication may be considered an unfair practice in violation of section 5 of the FTC Act; and (2) the limit~ of the FTC authority
under section 5 are continuously redefined. 100
The Truth-in-Lending advertising provisions have nearly eliminateel
such ads as "$1 down and $1 per week" for expensive merchandise. It
has also established uniform disclosure procedures. ' 0 ' However, most
credit advertisements still do not disclose the whole truth. Furthermore,
many creditors have either stopped advertising their interest rates or been
reluctant to advertise with any specificity whatsoever. ' 0 ' For example,
plugs such as "the cheapest credit in town'' and "liberal terms" are
widely used to avoid Truth-in-Lending advertising disclosure requirements by their vaguene5s. While the Truth-in-Lending Act has failed to have advertisers meet the whole truth standard, it has produced
credit advertising which contains nothing but truth. The next order of
business in Truth-in-Lending is to amend the Act in such a way that it requires disclosure of interest rates in all credit advertising.

CONCLUSIO'.'i
Although there are some differences in opinion5 and research findings
concerning the impact of the Truth-in-Lending Act, the evidence, as
presented in this paper, indicates that the Act works. (I) There has been
considerable growth in consumer knowledge of credit costs since the Act
went into effect in 1969; (2) most creditors have substantially complied
with the disclosure requirements of the Act; and (3) the remedies of civil
damages, credit advertising, and other important provisions through
Truth-in-Lending litigation have provided the impetus to achieve the
congressional goal of informing the cost of credit to the vast number of
Americans who purchase items on credit.
From the standpoint of the creditor, the Truth-in-Lending Act is one
of the major uncontrollable variables limiting the power of decision.
Both the Act and Regulation Z are actually a complex of limitations
coming from a number of different sources. Unfortunately, legal constraints based on the Act and Regulation Z are far from being clear-cut
prohibitions, thus leaving an ill-defined and uncertain boundary between
what is legal and what is illegal.
First, the Act covers many organizations and people, ranging from
banks and department stores to doctors and plumbers; some of these had
never previously considered themselves as engaged in extending con·
sumer credit. All of these creditors are required to conform their various
methods of making disclosures to the method specified in the Act and
Regulation Z. Secondly, some governmental agencies, such as the FTC,
are authorized to enforce the various provisions of the Act, while others,
such as the Board of Governors, are charged with administering them.
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Thirdly, there are not only law-making bodies at both state and federal
levels which amend the existing laws and enact new laws, but also courts
at both levels which render different interpretations and set precedents
for decisions in subsequent cases.
Because, in most instances, the Truth-in-Lending A ct provides no
dear-cut guides for creditors to comply with, conscientious consumer
creditors have had many problems in complying with the disclosure requirements of the Act. It may be convenient to think of the Act as constituting the rules of a game subject to differences in interpretation by
courts, admi nistrative agencies, creditors, and consumers. To achieve the
intended purpose of the Act, the government must effectively administer
it and vigorously prosecute those creditor\ who violate the disclosure requirements of the Act. It is also important that the government continues
to educate consumers for a greater understanding of the existence and
importance of the Act. Above all, the government must place heavy emphasis on its effort to provide creditors with clarification of the Act it administers and en forces.
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